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The effect of entry regulation on process innovation in the swiss
mail industry
Abstract
We develop an industry specific modeö of proce competition with product differentiation to analyze the
effect of entry regulation on process innovation in the Swiss mail industry. We consider the four most
prominent scenarios: regulated monopoly, end-to-end competition, worksharing without bypass, and
worksharing with bypass. Based on model calibration with data from the Swiss letter market, we find
that the incentives to invest in process innovation decrease with deregulation. However, even accounting
for this fact, the efficiency gains from partial liberalization, i.e. worksharing, ensure an increase in social
welfare.
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1. Introduction
The mail industry, like other network industries such as the electricity and tel-
ecommunications industries, is currently undergoing fundamental changes. In 
particular, now that both the European Union’s as well as Switzerland’s parcel 
markets are largely deregulated, authorities are determined to open the letter 
markets to competitors, anticipating that competitive pressure induces competi-
tors to become more efficient by way of innovation. In this paper, we ask whether 
competitive pressure in the Swiss mail industry will actually lead to more incen-
tives to innovate or not.
There is a consensus among the industrialized countries that some further 
deregulation is desirable. However, there is no consensus as to how far this proc-
ess should go. Supporters of a full deregulation (end-to-end competition) promote 
a scenario where new competitors are fully independent of the incumbent postal 
operator and collect, sort, transport, and deliver their mail themselves. However, 
 D / G / L / F / F
1 In addition to the empirical literature referenced above, see also B, C and P 
(1997) for its discussion of how the possibility of outsourcing helps with the interpretation of 
some empirical findings.
2 As of April 1, 2006, the Swiss government lowered the weight for letters reserved exclusively to 
the incumbent to at most 100 grams (P, 2006). By comparison, the weight 
limit for members of the European Union is set at 50 grams as of January 1, 2006, although 
individual members are free to lower this limit even further.
there is also another view, chiefly supported by the United States. Supporters of 
this view argue that the high costs of establishing and maintaining an area-wide 
delivery network are to a large extent fixed costs, hence delivery exhibits strong 
economies of scale (see R and T, 1993; C, D R, F-
 and R, 1997; P R C, 2000). Economies of scale 
in delivery can best be realized if there is only a single provider delivering mail. 
None of the other main activities of the postal value chain exhibit particularly 
strong economies of scale.1 Thus, competition is encouraged in the “upstream” 
segment (collection, sorting, and transportation) and discouraged in the “down-
stream” segment (delivery). To facilitate this scenario (known as worksharing), 
the incumbent postal operator is given the exclusive right to deliver its mail, but 
is forced to allow competitors access to its delivery network. 
In addition to end-to-end competition and worksharing, there is a third sce-
nario, which results from a combination of these two scenarios. In this new sce-
nario (known as worksharing with bypass), entrants can choose to either com-
pete with the incumbent end-to-end, to make use of the incumbent’s obligation 
to deliver the entrants’ mail, or both. The last option gives entrants the opportu-
nity for a highly selective market entry, delivering only some types of mail (e.g. 
mail to cities) and relying on the incumbent to deliver the remaining mail (e.g. 
mail to remote areas). 
The federal council of Switzerland has not yet decided to pursue deregulation 
towards any particular state, although the council is committed to a gradual 
market opening (F C, 2002).2 In light of this situation, the prin-
cipal issue from an economic point of view becomes how to best proceed with 
the deregulation of the letter market. In particular, given the options outlined 
so far, the question is whether to steer the mail market towards a state of end-to-
end competition, a state of worksharing without bypass, or a state of workshar-
ing with bypass.
We give a brief overview of how postal economists have approached this ques-
tion so far. C and K (1998) begin with a general analysis of 
the nature and justification of the universal service obligation (USO), and then 
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3 The reserved area describes the services only the established postal operator is allowed to pro-
vide. Its main purpose is to finance the costs of the universal service obligation.
develop an analytical framework to determine the optimal scope of the reserved 
area.3 Different in its aim, C, G, F, M, R and 
T (2001) focus on the question of what strategies the incumbent is likely 
to adopt in the face of the threat of entry, and on what their consequences are. 
P (2002) critically reviews the assumptions underlying the idea of mandat-
ing access to the incumbent postal operator’s downstream network. He argues 
that mandating access to the incumbent’s delivery network (i.e. worksharing) is 
best seen as a temporary instrument to promote competition and illustrates how 
worksharing can lead to inefficiencies in the long run.
All of these studies bypass the question of whether competition leads to more 
innovation, which in turn leads to more efficient processes and lower prices. They 
calculate the new prices directly based on the competitive situation in the end-
user market. They neglect the question that competitors have different incentives 
to improve efficiency based on the new competitive situation. In this paper, we 
try to fill this gap with regards to the Swiss mail industry. 
There is of course literature that deals with the question of competition and 
innovation in a general setting. In his seminal work, A (1962) studies cost 
reducing innovations and concludes that “the incentive to invest [in R&D] is 
less under monopolistic than under competitive conditions”. Arrow looks at the 
incentive of an outside investor who can sell his innovation to the firms in the 
product market on a royalty basis. The firms in the product market can then 
either produce at their old costs, or pay royalties to the investor and produce at 
reduced marginal costs. We do not believe that Arrow’s setting is appropriate to 
answer the question we are interested in. We want to know how the new com-
petitive setting affects the national economy. Thus, we are primarily interested 
in how the postal operators’ incentives to innovate are affected by the new com-
petitive setting. We are not as much interested in how the incentives change for 
a third party supplier. For this reason, in this paper’s model, there is no outside 
investor. Instead, market participants invest into innovations only they can ben-
efit from. This is an important difference to Arrow’s model which means that 
Arrow’s conclusion does not necessarily hold for our setting as well.
Instead of going into more detail, we recommend M (1993) and B 
(2000), who have already done expert overviews of the existing literature on com-
petition and innovation. We also mention B and G (1995), B-
, G and V R (1995) and N (1996) for their empiri-
cal work on competition and innovation.
 D / G / L / F / F
4 As noted in the introduction, Swiss Post only enjoys monopoly protection up to a weight limit 
of 100 grams. However, the present state is still a de facto monopoly, since only about 11% of 
all letters fall outside of the reserved area (PR, 2005, p. 12).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model. The 
model takes into account the two most important characteristics of the mail 
industry: Economies of scale in delivery and the universal service obligation. In 
Section 3, we calibrate our model. We choose to work with calibration rather 
than to design a model producing easily interpretable analytical results. This 
approach allows us to work with a much more accurate model of postal econom-
ics, containing features that would otherwise have to be sacrificed for simplicity: 
It allows us to work with two separate regions with different costs, two different 
segments of the postal value chain, and different costs for the incumbent and 
entrant. In Section 4, we present the results. We find that in general, a profit-
maximizing monopolist has strong incentives to invest in process innovations. 
However, the monopolist’s behaviour does not translate into added benefits for 
the consumers. Unless the entrant can innovate at no more than about a third 
of the incumbents’ costs, the positive effects of process innovation on welfare 
decrease with liberalization. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
We introduce our model by developing the assumptions for the reference case, 
i.e. the regulated monopoly.4 Then, we consider the three types of entry regula-
tion outlined in the introduction: end-to-end competition, worksharing without 
bypass, and worksharing with bypass.
2.1 Reference Case: Regulated Monopoly
We assume that a customer’s (or sender’s) utility depends on the quantity of let-
ters sent. Our representative sender has quasilinear preferences in money and a 
quadratic utility function over quantities. We divide the market into two regions 
r ! h,l, where h denotes the urban region with high population and l denotes 
the rural region with low population. The utility function of the representative 
sender is defined by:
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( ( ) )
2
r r r r
r
U a q b q y! " #$  (1)
The Effect of Entry Regulation on Process Innovation 
where a,b % 0. Variables qh and ql refer to the amount of mail sent to each region, 
and y is the amount of money spent on other goods. 
The sender must satisfy the budget constraint ,rry p q m$# &  where p denotes 
the monopolist’s price. The monopolist’s price is uniform across all regions. Prices 
are subject to approval by the regulatory authorities. In determining whether a 
price is approved or not, the price level of the newly proposed basket of serv-
ices is compared with the price level of the same services at past prices. Current 
price levels are raised in order to account for the effects of inflation, and low-
ered in order to account for gains in productivity. For a more in depth expla-
nation of the ways to determine and implement pricing schemes, we refer to 
D V, C, R and T (2003). Thus, in principle, gains 
in productivity induced by lower costs lead to lower prices. This relation raises 
an important question, namely the question of whether a monopolist still has 
actually any incentives for cost savings if the monopolist must lower prices in 
accordance with the observed decrease in costs. We argue that incentives for cost 
savings remain even for a monopolist. The principal reason is that while prices 
are corrected in order to account for gains in productivity in the long run, the 
monopolist is allowed to keep the added profits from innovation in the short 
run, i.e. between dates where price levels are determined. In the short run, the 
monopolist behaves as if price levels remained constant. For this reason, in our 
model, we treat the monopolist’s price level as an exogenously given constant. 
Completing the description of the budget constraint, parameter m denotes the 
initial wealth endowment.
Utility maximization then leads to the demand function for region r:
 
1
( ) ( )
r r
rq p a pb
! "  (2)
We divide the postal value chain into two segments s ! u,d. We regard the activi-
ties of collection, transportation, and sorting as a composite upstream activity, 
which we denote by u. We denote delivery, the downstream activity, by d. The 
upstream activities come at a marginal cost of .ruc  The universal service obliga-
tion (USO) requires the monopolist to maintain its delivery network regardless of 
market demand. Therefore, a part of the monopolist’s downstream costs is fixed. 
We denote these fixed costs by Fd , and the variable downstream costs by .
r
dc
Process innovations can occur in the upstream and the downstream activi-
ties. More efficient letter sorting machines are an example of upstream innova-
tions. Optimized delivery routes are an example of downstream innovations. We 
introduce process innovations into our model by assuming that the regulated 
 D / G / L / F / F
monopolist can reduce its initial marginal costs by a fraction .rsk  Following 
D’A and J (1988) we assume that the investments in cost 
reduction are a quadratic function of the cost reduction:
 
21
( )
2
r r
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Parameter z is a scale parameter, with z % 0. Profit is given by the function:
 
[( (1 ) ) ]
r r r r
s s s d
r s s
p k c q I F' ! " " " "$ $ $  (4)
Given the uniform price, the monopolist chooses the profit-maximizing cost 
reductions .rsk  We obtain the equilibrium value:
 
( )
r r
r s s
s
q c
k
z
!  (5)
2.2 Multiple Service Providers
We now add the possibility of market entry. When designing a model of market 
entry, one must ask whether to model entry by one potential entrant or by sev-
eral entrants. If several entrants are considered, then new entrants enter as long 
as market entry remains profitable. With every additional entrant, each entrant’s 
profit decreases. The last entrant to enter is the one who is just indifferent between 
entering and staying out of the market. This indifference is equivalent to the con-
dition that each entrant’s profit must be zero. In this case, we can say that entrants 
behave like a competitive fringe, which is equivalent to a situation where there is 
just one entrant who earns a profit of zero. If one assumes only one entrant, then 
it is possible for the entrant to earn a strictly positive profit. We are interested 
not only in the effects of entry regulation on the incumbent service provider, but 
also in the effects of entry regulation on the entrant. We believe that it is more 
plausible to assume that entrants can indeed make a profit when discussing this 
paper’s specific question. For this reason, we chose to abstain from the assump-
tion of a competitive fringe and instead model just one entrant, who is allowed 
to earn a strictly positive profit.
This entrant E can enter either one or both regions, and choose different 
prices rEp  for each region. Thus, the entrant’s prices are endogenous variables. 
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On the other hand, the incumbent I must serve both regions at an exogenously 
given uniform price pI . 
The customers’ utility function is
 
2 2
( ( ) ( ) )
2 2
r r
r r r r r r r r r
I I I E E E I E
r
b b
U a q q a q q eb q q y! " # " " #$  (6)
where a,b % 0 and 0 ( e ( 1. The parameter e allows for differentiated products. The 
restriction imposed on this parameter means that the service providers’ products 
are imperfect substitutes. Given the budget constraint ( )r r rI I E Ery p q p q m$# # & , 
utility maximization leads to the demand functions:
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As mentioned in the description of the reference case, the USO results in a fixed 
cost for the incumbent, which we denote by FId. The entrant is not subject to the 
obligation to maintain its delivery network, and therefore we assume that all of 
the entrant’s costs are variable in the long run. For a discussion of this assump-
tion, see D D, C and R (2005). The incumbent can 
reduce its initial marginal costs by a fraction rIsk  at investments of
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2
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and the entrant can reduce its initial marginal costs by a fraction rEsk  at invest-
ments of
 2
1
( )
2
r r
Es EsI z k!  (10)
For simplicity, we first assume that the incumbent’s and entrant’s scale param-
eter is the same. Then, we introduce the possibility of different scale parameters. 
This is done to reflect the idea that due to their greater flexibility, entrants can 
 D / G / L / F / F
5 The access price can either be negotiated or set directly by the regulating authority. For 
our model, we assume that the access price resembles the incumbent’s delivery costs before 
innovate at lower costs than incumbents. We note that firms invest individu-
ally. In principle, innovation could be treated as a collective public good where 
both firms reap the benefits of investment jointly. In order to solve the incentive 
problem associated with the investment in public goods, firms could make use 
of contracts. We decide however not to pursue this approach because we were 
unable to find any evidence competitors in the postal market actually participate 
in joint R&D projects. We believe that is more prudent to assume that firms do 
not cooperate.
2.2.1 End-to-End Competition
In the case of end-to-end competition, the entrant competes with the incumbent 
over the whole value chain. The profit functions are:
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Given the uniform price pI, the incumbent chooses the profit-maximizing cost 
reductions .rIsk  Simultaneously, the entrant maximizes for prices 
r
Ep  and cost 
reductions .rEsk  Assuming strictly positive fixed costs in delivery, that there are 
no fixed costs in the upstream activities, that the rural areas marginal costs 
are strictly higher than the corresponding costs of the urban area, and that the 
incumbents price is set such that the incumbent breaks even over the whole 
market, the entrant does not enter the rural region. The reason is that the entrant 
cannot set a price in the rural region that it is high enough to cover its marginal 
costs, yet low enough to be competitive with the incumbent’s uniform price.
2.2.2 Worksharing without Bypass
In the case of worksharing without bypass, incumbent and entrant compete 
for upstream activities. The incumbent retains the monopoly on delivery, but 
is required to deliver the entrant’s mail at a uniform access price ) per unit of 
mail.5 Profit functions are given by:
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innovation takes place. This result is a plausible outcome of negotiations between the incum-
bent and the entrant and a reasonable starting point for a regulating authority. However, 
access prices determined in this way are not necessarily socially optimal. For the purposes of 
our model, we take the access price as an exogenous variable.
[( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) ) ]
r r r r r r r
I I Is Is I Is Is Is E Id
r s s s
p k c q I k c q F' ! " " " # )" " "$ $ $ $  (13)
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r r r r r
E E Eu Eu E Eu
r
p k c q I' ! " " #) "$  (14)
The term [( (1 ) ) ]r r rI Is Is Ir sp k c q$ $" "  is the profit margin resulting from mail 
collected, sorted, transported, and delivered by the incumbent. The term 
$r[ ( (1 ) ) ]
r r r
Is Is Es k c q$ )" "  is the profit margin resulting from delivering the 
entrant’s mail. The entrant’s profit function is similar to the entrant’s profit 
function under end-to-end competition. The difference is that the entrant’s mar-
ginal costs for delivery after cost reduction (1 )r rEd Edk c"  are replaced by the access 
fee ). Furthermore, the entrant has no innovation incentives in the downstream 
segment. Given the incumbent’s uniform price pI, the incumbent maximizes 
profit for cost reductions .rIsk  Simultaneously, the entrant maximizes profit for 
prices rEp  and cost reductions .
r
Euk  Depending on whether the prices 
r
Ep  result 
in a positive demand for the entrant’s services, the entrant enters either one or 
both regions.
2.2.3 Worksharing with Bypass
The case of worksharing with bypass is a combination of the previous cases. The 
entrant can enter either one or both regions, and either competes with the incum-
bent over the whole value chain, or provides only the upstream activities and uses 
the incumbent’s delivery network. This choice does not have to be the same in 
the two regions. The entrant’s choice on how to compete depends on how the 
entrant’s marginal costs after reduction by process innovations compare to the 
access price. If (1 )  for all ,r rEd Edk c r)% "  then the profit functions are the same as 
under end-to-end competition. If (1 )  for all ,r rEd Edk c r)( "  then the profit func-
tions are the same as under worksharing without bypass. In the case in which 
the entrant uses the incumbent’s delivery network only in the rural region, i.e., 
if (1 )h hEd Edk c)% "  and (1 )
l l
Ed Edk c)( " , profits are:
 D / G / L / F / F
6 There is some divergence in the literature concerning the price elasticity of demand in the 
letter market (C and F, 2002). The literature claims that –0.9  *  –0.2. There-
fore, we performed extensive sensitivity analyses on our results for these values. Our qualita-
tive results are independent of * within this range.
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The term ( (1 ) )l l lIs Is Es k c q$ )" "  is the incumbent’s profit margin resulting from 
delivering the entrant’s mail to the rural region. The term ( (1 ) )h h h hE Es Es Esp k c q$" "  
is the entrant’s profit margin resulting from competing end-to-end in the urban 
region. The term ( (1 ) )l l l lE Eu Eu Ep k c q" " #)  is the entrant’s profit margin result-
ing from competing in the upstream segment in the rural region. The choice 
variables are the same as in the previous cases.
In all cases, the optimal cost reductions are proportional to the volume of mail 
and to the costs of the corresponding region and segment. The result that proc-
ess innovations are driven mainly by quantities seems straightforward. However, 
quantities reflect the specifics of the postal market adapted to a certain regula-
tory scenario, taking into account the competitive environment.
3. Calibration
In order to obtain quantitative results, we first calibrate our model for the regu-
lated monopoly, using data of the Swiss letter market. Then, to predict the out-
comes for multiple service providers, we modify the parameters accordingly.
In order to calculate the parameters of the demand function for a regulated 
monopoly, we assume a uniform price equal to pRM ! € 0.5, and a correspond-
ing total demand of qRM ! 3 billion. A quarter of the total amount is sent to the 
rural region, thus 2.25hRMq ! billion and 750
l
RMq ! million. For the price elas-
ticity of demand, we use the estimation * ! –0.5.6 Using
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7 If the incumbent’s price is regulated in accordance with price-based or cost-based regulation 
(see B and P (1989) for an overview), the regulator reduces the uniform 
price if profits increase as a result of innovation. Even though this price reduction results in 
increased consumer surplus, the effect on total welfare is not easily determined as innova-
tion incentives and industry profits decrease. We continue to take the incumbent’s price as an 
exogenous variable, and assume that it remains unchanged.
8 See R and T (1993), C, D R, F and R (1997) and 
P R C (2000).
9 See D, T and B (2005).
10 See R and T (1993), C, D R, F and R (1997) and 
P R C (2000).
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we can calculate the parameters determining the demand function of each region. 
Swiss Post is able to approximately break even in the letter market. Therefore, 
the monopolist’s initial profit 'RM is zero. Assuming that the monopolist’s uni-
form price remains unchanged, the monopolist can increase profits through 
innovation.7
Total delivery costs amount for approximately half the total costs, i.e., half 
the total revenue under the assumption that there is no profit. As outlined in 
D, T and B (2005) we estimate that 60% of the monopo-
list’s delivery costs are fixed, i.e., Fd ! € 450 million. We make the assumption 
that all upstream costs are variable. Although a simplification, this assumption 
is essentially compatible with the empirical literature.8
Given the proportion between marginal costs in the urban and rural regions, 
as well as the observed prices, quantities, profits, and fixed costs in the reference 
case, we can derive the marginal costs for each activity. Defining 2l hu uc c+ , we 
obtain € 0.2,huc ! € 0.4,
l
uc ! € 0.08
h
dc !  and € 0.16.
l
dc !  Please note that 
the marginal cost in the high cost area is twice the marginal cost in the low cost 
simply by definition. In other words, we differentiate between areas on the sole 
basis of the magnitude of a region’s marginal cost, rather than geographic con-
siderations. Of course, this approach requires a reasonably accurate estimate of 
the regions’ respective proportions.9 Furthermore we assume constant marginal 
costs. We make this assumption mainly since we do not have any data indicating 
otherwise, and since it is essentially in line with the empirical literature.10
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11 This value is a weighted average of the values quoted in D, T and B 
(2005). The incumbent’s advantage results from switching costs of the consumers. All other 
things being equal, consumers have no incentive to switch to an alternative service provider 
who offers the same products at the same quality at the same price.
Assuming that a one percent decrease of marginal costs requires identical 
investments in all segments and regions, we have to determine a value of the 
scale parameter z. In January 2003, Swiss Post launched a project called Reengi-
neering Mail Processing, i.e., REMA (S P, 2003). Swiss Post estimates 
that the expected cost savings resulting from a restructuring of internal proc-
esses in the upstream segment amount to 25 percent. Based on this information, 
and given that r r rs s sk q c z! , we obtain z ! 1.8 , 10
9. As noted before, we start 
from the assumption that the incumbent and entrant innovate at the same rela-
tive costs. Then, we introduce the possibility of a different scale parameter for 
the entrant.
We set the parameter that determines the degree of product differentiability 
to be equal to e = 0.75, which is in line with D D, C, F, 
G and R (2001). Furthermore, in case the entrant offers its 
mail service at the same price as the incumbent, we assume that the incumbent 
receives a market share of x = 70%.11 Finally, by substituting the incumbent’s 
uniform price pI and the entrant’s prices 
r
Ep  for pRM and using the relation that 
describes the incumbent’s advantage
 / ( )r r rI I Eq q q x# !  (19)
we can solve the demand functions of each region for the given demand param-
eters rEa  and ,
r
Ia  since
 r rI RMa a!  (20)
and
 - .
1 1 1
1 1 2
1 /
r
E Ia a e p ee e x x x
/ 0/ 0 / 0
! " # # " "1 2 1 21 2
3 4 3 4" # 3 4
 (21)
Note that parameters rEb  and 
r
Ib  are derived using equations (17) and (18) in an 
analogous manner as in the case of regulated monopoly.
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12 It is however not ex post efficient. We refer to D D, C and R (2005) 
who discuss this point.
The regulator sets the access price to be equal to the incumbent’s average costs 
of delivery per unit. Thus, the regulator divides the observed total downstream 
costs by the total amount of mail delivered, obtaining
 €
( )
 0.25
r r
Id I Idr
r
Ir
c q F
q
#
)! !
$
$
 (22)
This policy is compatible with the political aim to allow the incumbent postal 
operator to break even.12
4. Results & Discussion
Table 1 shows the investments in innovation by scenario.
Table 1: Investments in Innovation by Scenario (Figures are in Millions of Euros)
Scenario Investments by the Incumbent Investments by the Entrant
Urban Area Rural Area Total 
Incum-
bent
Urban Area
Total 
Entrant
Up-
stream
Down-
stream
Up-
stream
Down-
stream
Up-
stream
Down-
stream
Monopoly 56.36 9.02 25.01 4.00 94.39
End-to-End 
Competition
33.22 5.32 25.01 4.00 67.55 5.41 5.41 10.82
Worksharing 
without Bypass
38.57 10.09 25.01 4.00 77.67 2.99 2.99
Worksharing 
with Bypass
33.22 5.32 25.01 4.00 67.55 5.41 5.41 10.82
The case of worksharing with bypass equals the case of end-to-end competition. 
The reason is that the access price ) is higher than the entrant’s marginal deliv-
ery costs, i.e. (1 ) for all .r rEd Edk c r)% "  As noted before, the entrant does not enter 
the rural region under end-to-end competition. Since entry into the rural region 
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is even more costly under worksharing without bypass than under end-to-end 
competition, the entrant never enters the rural region.
Under the assumptions made so far, in particular, under the assumption that 
the entrant’s costs of innovation are the same as the incumbent’s costs of inno-
vation, it is no surprise that the strongest innovation incentives occur in the case 
of a regulated monopoly. Economies of scale are the underlying reason. Com-
paring different entry scenarios with multiple service providers, we can see that 
the incumbent’s incentives to innovate are greater under worksharing without 
bypass than under end-to-end competition (or worksharing with bypass). This 
happens because the entrant is forced to set a higher price under worksharing 
without bypass than under end-to-end competition, since (1 )r rEd Edk c r)% " 5 . 
The incumbent’s demand increases with an increase in the entrant’s price, i.e. 
( , ) / 0
r r r
I I E Eq p p p6 6 % . Therefore, the incumbent’s demand is higher under work-
sharing without bypass than under end-to-end competition, and investments in 
process innovations are more attractive. The entrant’s innovation incentives are 
stronger under end-to-end competition (or worksharing with bypass) than under 
worksharing without bypass. One reason is that the entrant sets a lower price 
under end-to-end competition than in the other cases, as explained above. Thus, 
the entrant’s demand is higher under end-to-end competition, and investments in 
process innovations are more attractive. Furthermore, the entrant only invests in 
optimizing its delivery process if operating in the downstream segment. 
Table 2 shows the net effects of investments in innovation on profits by 
scenario.
In the monopoly case, we observe the greatest gains in profits. One reason is 
that as shown above, the incumbent’s incentives to innovate are strongest in the 
monopoly case. The other reason is that the monopolist’s investments in process 
innovation are exclusively added to the monopolist’s profit, i.e., neither competi-
tors nor consumers benefit.
When we compare the scenarios with multiple service providers, we see that the 
incumbent’s added profits due to innovation are higher under worksharing with-
out bypass than under end-to-end competition (or worksharing with bypass). One 
reason is that the incumbent invests more under worksharing without bypass. 
The other reason is that the incumbent benefits from the entrant’s innovation 
activity only under worksharing without bypass. The incumbent benefits from 
the entrant’s innovation because the entrant’s process innovations result in lower 
marginal costs. Therefore, the entrant lowers its prices, and demand increases. 
Since the incumbent delivers the entrant’s mail at an access price ) per unit of 
mail, the entrant’s payments to the incumbent increase.
Table 3 shows the net effects of investments in innovation on welfare.
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Table 2: Net Effects of Investments in Innovation on Profits by Scenario 
(Figures are in Millions of Euros)
Scenario Incumbent Entrant
Total 
Investments by 
the Incumbent
Net Effect of 
Investments on 
Profits*
Total 
Investments by 
the Entrant
Net Effect of 
Investments on 
Profits*
Monopoly 94.39
#94.39
(94.87)
End-to-End 
Competition
67.55
#54.38
(–47.06)
10.82
#9.58
(81.09)
Worksharing 
without Bypass
77.67
#77.82
(80.75)
2.99
#2.82
(48.54)
Worksharing 
with Bypass
67.55
#54.38
(–47.06)
10.82
#9.58
(81.09)
* overall profit after innovation in brackets
Table 3: Net Effects of Investments in Innovation on Welfare by Scenario 
(Figures are in Millions of Euros)
Scenario Total 
Investments by 
the Incumbent
Net Effect of 
Investments on 
Profits*
Net Effect of 
Investments 
on Consumer 
Surplus**
Net Effect of 
Investments on 
Social Surplus*** 
Monopoly 94.39
#94.39
(94.40)
#0.00
(1501.20)
#94.39
(1596.10)
End-to-End 
Competition
78.36
#63.96
(36.64)
#10.19
(1548.50)
#74.15
(1585.10)
Worksharing 
without Bypass
80.66
#80.64
(130.03)
#2.90
(1527.40)
#83.54
(1657.40)
Worksharing 
with Bypass
78.36
#63.96
(36.64)
#10.19
(1548.50)
#74.15
(1585.10)
* overall profit after innovation in brackets
** overall consumer surplus after innovation in brackets
*** overall social surplus after innovation in brackets
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These results follow directly from the observed investments in innovation shown 
in Table 1. In a regulated monopoly consumers do not get any benefit from inno-
vation, therefore the entire welfare gains go to the monopolist. In contrast, con-
sumers do benefit from innovation whenever there are multiple service providers, 
although the service providers get the lion’s share in all cases. It is important to 
note that although the difference in social surplus resulting from process inno-
vation is highest in the monopoly case, the largest overall surplus results under 
worksharing without bypass. The main reason is that consumer surplus increases 
through product differentiation. Social surplus is higher under worksharing with-
out bypass than under end-to-end competition because the incumbent’s fixed costs 
to maintain its delivery network are divided over a larger quantity of mail.
We now introduce the possibility that the entrant can achieve the same cost 
reduction at lower investments than the incumbent. Formally, we write
 212 ( )
r r
Es EsI hz k!  (22)
where 0 ( h ( 1. By increasing the entrant’s cost advantage, i.e., by decreasing 
parameter h, we get an idea of the robustness of our result that the added social 
surplus is highest in the monopoly case. Given our calibration, the entrant must 
be able to innovate at 33.2% of the incumbent’s costs under end-to-end compe-
tition, and at 36.6% of the incumbent’s costs under worksharing without bypass 
so that the scenarios with multiple service providers are more attractive than the 
monopoly case.
To evaluate the impact of a change in other critical parameters on our results, we 
perform sensitivity analyses. In particular, the access price ) and the incumbent’s 
uniform price pI deserve consideration. We subjected our results to variations of 
these parameters in the intervals € 0.40 & pI & € 0.60 and € 0.15 & ) & € 0.35. 
We found that our main results are robust to variations in these intervals, i.e., the 
comparisons between different regulatory scenarios regarding investments into 
process innovations and welfare implications remain unchanged.
5. Conclusion
In general, a profit-maximizing monopolist has strong incentives to invest in 
process innovations. However, the monopolist’s behaviour does not translate into 
added benefits for the consumers. Unless the entrant can innovate at no more 
than about a third of the incumbents’ costs, the positive effects of process inno-
vation on welfare decrease with liberalization. 
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Although the incentives to invest in process innovations are strongest for a reg-
ulated monopoly, the largest overall surplus results under worksharing without 
bypass. Therefore, even though we find that the incentives to invest in process 
innovations decrease with liberalization; partial liberalization is desirable from 
an overall welfare point of view.
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SUMMARY
We develop an industry specific model of price competition with product differ-
entiation to analyze the effect of entry regulation on process innovation in the 
Swiss mail industry. We consider the four most prominent scenarios: Regulated 
monopoly, end-to-end competition, worksharing without bypass, and work-
sharing with bypass. Based on model calibration with data from the Swiss letter 
market, we find that the incentives to invest in process innovations decrease with 
deregulation. However, even accounting for this fact, the efficiency gains of a 
partial liberalization, i.e. worksharing, ensure an increase in social welfare.
